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COMMENTS
RIGHT OF LATERAL SUPPORT OF LAND IN TEXAS
R EMOVE one side of an arch and the other side will fall. Open
a side-wall door near the bottom of a full grain bin and the
grain will flow out through the opening, allowing the surface of the
grain to subside. In ways suggested by either or both of these
examples the land of each owner supports the adjoining land and
is itself supported by such adjoining land. What right has each
owner to have this support of his land continued? What duty has
he to maintain the support which his land gives to the adjoining
land?
This comment will be limited to an analysis of the right of
lateral support as distinguished from the right of subjacent sup-
port,' and will not include a consideration of the withdrawal of
subterranean water or other fluids of which the constituents are
preponderantly water.2 In Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pa-
cific Coal & Oil Co. the Texas Commission of Appeals defined
the nature and extent of the right as follows:
Ex vi necessitate, there is an area of a sort of common ownership
near the boundary and from surface to center of the earth; that
ownership being known as the right to "lateral support."... Physical
invasion of that area, with resultant damage directly attributable to
injury to property in or on the adjoining tract, being accompanied
by liability absolute or contingent upon lack of due prudence accord-
ingly as the injury may be to the adjoining tract in its natural state
or to improvements.... 3
With the analogies of the arch and grain bin in mind, it will
be the writer's purpose here to relate them to land and to explore
1 "Support is lateral when the supported and supporting lands are divided by a
vertical plane. Support is subjacent when the supported land is above and the support-
ing land is beneath it." 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) 184.
2 "To the extent that a person is not liable for withdrawing subterranean waters from
the land of another, he is not liable for a subsidence of the other's land which is caused
by the withdrawal." 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 188.
3 298 S. W. 554, 559 (1927). Comanche Duke was an oil-field case, ultimately decided
on the basis of negligent blasting. The court's mention of the right of lateral support,
although by way of dictum, illustrates the elusive nature of the concept.
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the practical problems which are met in applying the rules of
lateral support law. Texas cases on the subject will be discussed
after the prevailing views in other jurisdictions have been briefly
summarized. In conclusion certain judicial and legislative steps
which appear desirable will be suggested.
THE PROBLEM OF LATERAL SUPPORT IN TEXAS
In a state largely devoted to agrarian purposes few questions
of lateral support will arise. A farmer or rancher will ordinarily
build valuable improvements far away from a boundary line,
with the usual exception being his fence. This at once creates two
probabilities - (1) that no disturbance of the natural earth close
to the boundary line will be necessary, and (2) that no valuable
improvement will be found on the other side of such boundary
line in the event that a disturbance is necessary. In a state such
as Texas, which has long prided itself on the amount of "elbow-
room" available, it is natural that there should be fewer instances
of conflicting interests at property lines than in some of the more
crowded states.
As large areas of an agrarian state become urbanized, the situa-
tion there changes into one which is the opposite of that in the
rural areas. Instead of shying away from the boundary lines
toward the center of a large tract, the city builder is forced to
exploit every square foot of a small and expensive lot. The larger
the city and the greater the property valuation, the more neces-
sary this total utilization becomes. In this latter situation there
develop intense conflicts of interest regarding the rights of lateral
support.
Texas is undergoing a metamorphosis. Certainly there is nothing
unique in the change- the northeastern portion of the United
States having experienced a similar one during most of the last
century - but consider how it has affected the average Texan dur-
ing the past half-century. In 1900 only ten per cent of all Texans
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lived in cities of 10,000 population or greater, whereas today over
half of them do. In 1900 Texas had no city exceeding 100,000
population while today one out of every four of us lives in such
a city.4 Many of the problems which this trend portends are
obvious. Some are not so obvious, and it is submitted that the
law of lateral support of land is one of the latter - one which
will get in the future more attention than it has received in the
past.
Texas is entering a critical period of growth and development
when the possibility of economic waste seems to indicate that the
public interest would be better served by a set of affirmative rules
designed to prevent damage from occurring than would a set of
negative rules fixing liability after it has occurred.5
For the practical importance of lateral support problems to
any owner of property, one must look at the questions which the
lawyer must answer for the architect and engineer. Each owner
is a dominant owner to the extent that he is entitled to support
from his neighbors. His own estate is servient to similar rights of
his neighbors. The determination of these rights and duties must
be made as to each neighbor and may vary slightly in each
instance. The lawyer representing a client who is first to build
in a particular area must determine what steps must be taken to
protect the structure against later lawful development by the
adjoining owners. The greater the freedom allowed the later
builder, the greater must be the extent of precaution by the earlier
one. The lawyer representing the later builder will be interested in
the duties owed by his client to the owners of buildings already in
place. If the property lies between developed and undeveloped
tracts, all of the above problems will arise in connection with one
excavation.
4 TEXAS ALMANAC, 1954-1955, p. 91.
5 See Note, Lateral Support for Existing Buildings During New Construction, 50
Yale L. J. 1125 (1941).
1954]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
THE LAW OF LATERAL SUPPORT OUTSIDE OF TEXAS
Answers to the above questions have been difficult to anticipate
because they have evolved from a conflict between two public
policies. One protects the first-comer whose valuable investment
made in good faith has contributed to the growth and prosperity
of the community. Where lateral support is concerned, however,
the first-corner's rights are rendered precarious by an equally
powerful policy in favor of encouraging further development.'
This latter policy is served by removing from the path of the
later developer as many as possible of the rights or limitations
which may hamper or make more burdensome the later develop-
ment. The law of lateral support centers upon the constant balanc-
ing of equities between the early-comer and the late one, and the
attempts of the courts not to lean unreasonably in the direction of
either. The same struggle is evident in the cases of water rights,
oil and gas extraction rights, easements, and adverse possession
generally. With the exception of those states admitting some por-
tions of the appropriation doctrine, American jurisdictions lean
heavily in favor of any late-comer if his purpose is a socially
beneficial one. This preference is also found in the law of lateral
support.
Under the general rule, the liability of the owner of the servient
estate will depend upon which of three conditions is found to
have existed in the land of the dominant owner at the time the
subsidence and consequent damage occurred. The three conditions
are as follows:
Condition 1. The soil in its natural condition.
Condition 2. Structure on the soil, but soil would have
fallen in even without the structure.
6See opinion expressed in Recent Cases, 7 Minn. L. Rev (1922), concerning
Knapp v. Siegley, 120 Wash. 478, 208 Pac. 13 (1922), where the court allowed plaintiff
to recover for damage to house and trees as well as to the soil. The writer criticizes this
"enlargement" under Washington's constitution of the plaintiff early-corner's rights
and feels that it destroyed legal rights of the later-comer.
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Condition 3. Structure on the soil, but soil would not have
fallen in but for the structure.
As to the first condition the courts are almost unanimous in their
assertion that the owner of the servient estate is under an absolute
duty to maintain lateral support for the soil of the dominant estate
in its natural condition.'
Where the second condition is found, there is a division of
authority. Many American jurisdictions follow the so-called Eng-
lish rule and hold the owner of the servient estate absolutely
liable for all of the damages, both to the soil and to the structure.'
Other jurisdictions hold that the owner of the servient estate is
absolutely liable only for the damages to the soil and is not liable
for the damage to the structure unless he has been negligent.9
Where the third condition exists the courts are unanimous in
holding under the common law rule that the owner of the servient
estate has no absolute duty to support the structure on the dom-
inant estate, and is liable only in the event that the structure is
damaged through his negligence."x At this point statutes have inter-
vened in many states to set the standard of care in determining
negligence or, in some instances, to create an absolute liability."
71 Am. JuR., Adjoining Landowners, § 21; 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 817(1),
Comment b.
54 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 817(2), Comment m; Recent Cases, 77 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 405 (1929) ; Prete v. Cray, City Treasurer, 49 R. I. 209, 141 Atl. 609 (1928),
59 A. L. R. 1241 (1929). The Cray case involved the tapping of a stratum of quick-
sand by the city's excavation for a sewer, the quicksand running out from under the
plaintiff's land and causing it to subside, injuring the plaintiff's building. Holmes and
two other justices had dissented in a similar case reaching a similar result, Cabot v.
Kingman, 166 Mass. 403, 44 N. E. 344, 345 (1896), on the ground that the distinction
should have been between the support of liquids and the support of solids, with quick-
rand being considered as a liquid. The cases have not followed Holmes' distinction,
however, See 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 818, Comment b; Recent Cases, 19 Minn.
L. Rev. 587, 588, argues that Prete v. Cray represents the majority American view.
9 1 AM. JUR., Adjoining Landowners, § 43; see Note, 33 Am. St. Rep. 445, 475 (1893);
Recent Cases, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 405 (1929).
10 1 AM. JUR., Adjoining Landowners, §§ 26-28; Note, 33 Am. St. Rep. 445, 472
(1893).
11 1 AM. JUR., Adjoining Landowners, § 29, p. 524; Recent Cases, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 812
(1935), noting Tillson v. Consumers Power Co., 269 Mich. 53, 256 N. W. 801 (1934).
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The common law of lateral support is a combination of real
property and tort law.'" Where the first condition exists, the right
is a pure real property right - one that inheres in the land itself
and creates a servitude upon the land adjoining. The right to
recover under the third condition is one that finds its origin in
case and is purely a right in tort. This right in tort does not
inhere in the land, and the resultant liability is not limited to the
owner of the servient estate, but is equally available against all
the world. The second condition involves, under the English rule,
an extension by a rule of damages of the real property rule
applicable to the first condition, while in the jurisdictions which
do not follow the English rule the cause of action is split- the
real property rule of absolute liability being applied to the
damage to the soil and the tort rule of negligence being applied
to the damaged structure.
The practical effect of these rules is to leave any case of sub-
stantial damage in the field of tort law, since it is for damage to
costly structures that recovery will usually be sought. The real
property doctrine, applied where the soil is in its natural condi-
tion, settles upon the owner of the servient estate an absolute duty
to provide support, but only that naturally necessary to support
the land. Since the disturbance of a natural earth bank is relatively
easy to repair, the failure to provide support for it will seldom
result in anything more than the recovery of nominal damages
for the invasion of a legal right. When the second condition is
found to have existed, the owner of the dominant estate has some
slight hope to recover for building damage in jurisdictions fol-
lowing the English rule but only if he succeeds in proving that the
land would have subsided even without the building - practically
an impossibility except in the quicksand cases. A valuable struc-
ture is the primary thing that the owner of any dominant estate
is interested in protecting, but he is left under the common law
12 See Leesman, Significance of the Doctrine of Lateral Support as a Real Property
Right, 16 Ill. L. Rev. 108 (1922).
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rule to the dubious remedy of proving negligence if his structure
is damaged.
Negligence in any of its applications is confounding - in
lateral support cases it is especially so. For the purpose of this
discussion it will be assumed that it was reasonably necessary
for the owner of the servient estate to have made an excavation,
and attention will be given to the duty he owed the dominant
estate in making it. Ordinarily the foreseeability test is applied
in determining both negligence and proximate cause. In deter-
mining negligence it is applied to determine whether the defendant
should have foreseen that a certain act or omission would cause
injury to the plaintiff, thereby creating a duty to avoid such act
or omission. In the determination of the other essential element -
proximate cause - the foreseeability test is again applied to ascer-
tain whether the damages actually suffered were foreseeable or
whether the possibility of such damage was too remote. In cases
involving the negligent removal of lateral support, great caution
must be exercised in applying the foreseeability test. Foresee.
ability receives a standard application in testing proximate cause,
but before that point is reached the main problem arises of deter-
mining whether the defendant has been negligent - it is at this
point that one must be wary. The test is not whether the defendant
owner of the servient estate could have foreseen that damage would
result to a structure on the dominant estate from the removal of
lateral support, since this is not enough to create a duty to main-
tain such support. The courts have reasoned that to accept such
a premise would be tantamount to their creating an absolute duty
in tort that the servient owner provide lateral support for the
structure when the common law had refused to recognize it as a
real property right. The finding that the defendant servient owner
should have foreseen the damage to the building is not enough
1954]
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to create any duty except to see that the means employed to remove
the support do not unreasonably increase the risk.'" It appears
that if the owner of the servient estate is removing the support to
serve a reasonable social and economic purpose, and if he removes
such support carefully, he will not be liable even though he antici-
pated the building's collapse after the support was removed. 4
Where recovery is sought for negligent damage to structures,
the shifting tide of battle between the conflicting policies referred
to earlier makes the result in a particular case almost impossible
to anticipate. Whether the first-comer or the come-lately will pre-
vail, depends in any closely balanced case in large measure upon
which of the policies the presiding judge feels to be the sounder.
The undependable protection afforded a dominant owner by this
branch of the law has been obvious and has impelled many legis-
latures to fix rights and duties by statute.' 5 In a few states this
has been done by fixing the standard of care to be applied in
determining negligence, while in others the statutes have imposed
an absolute liability and the negligence issue has been removed. 6
In practically all cases where the constitutionality of the statutes
has been in issue they have been sustained, 17 and in most cases
the constitutionality is assumed.'"
The pendulum seems never to stop at dead center. Just as the
statutes and ordinances have been enacted to avoid the harsh and
uncertain results of the common law rules, so the courts have now
13 The courts have involved themselves in some difficulty at this point by reasoning
that if the servient estate owner's act of removing the lateral support is for some unrea-
sonable purpose, the removal is then negligent. It seems the better view to hold the
servient owner liable for unreasonable conduct of any sort, which would include the
careful making of an unnecessary excavation as well as the careless making of a nec-
essary one. This Comment is limited to the problems growing out of the latter. 4 RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS (1939), § 819, Comment e.
14 1 AM. JuR., Adjoining Landowners, § 26.
15 See note 11 supra.
16 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 819, Comment h.
17 Tillson v. Consumers Power Co., 269 Mich. 53, 256 N. W. 801 (1934).
1 s,... These statutes are usually enforced without discussion of their constitutional-
ity." See Recent Cases, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 812, 814 n. 8 (1935).
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begun inventing elaborate rationalizations in order to avoid the
sometimes equally harsh results of applying the statutes literally.
Examples can be found in the constructions of such terms as
"adjoining landowners""9 where it is sought to determine whether
a defendant is within or without the operation of a particular rule,
and in the peregrinations of a court which is trying to decide
whether a certain thing which has been built is a "structure" so
as to bring it within the protection of a building ordinance.0
In summary, the common law of lateral support outside of
Texas gives to the dominant owner an absolute right which is
practically useless- the right to the support of his soil in its
natural condition. It has provided no protection for structures
unless negligence can be proved. To avoid these results statutes
have been enacted either (1) to fix the standard of care for
proving negligence, or (2) to impose an absolute duty upon
the excavator to support buildings already in place.
TEXAS CASES ON LATERAL SUPPORT
There have been six Texas lawsuits in which the appellate
opinions contain some discussion of the law of lateral support.
Chronologically listed, they are:
Rowland v. Murphey, Texas Supreme Court, 1886,21 involved
Condition No. 3, and recovery was sought for negligent injury
to a house. There was no new twist in the case, the court seeming
to follow the general rule, although the judgment for plaintiff
was reversed and remanded on other grounds.
Simon v. Nance, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 190722
1 Williams v. Thompson -...........Tex -------------- 256 S. W. 2d 399, 403 (1953); Mc-
Daniel v. Wilson, 45 S. W. 2d 293, 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Chesapeake & 0. Ry.
v. May, 157, Ky. 708, 163 S. W. 1112 (1914) ; to distinguish "adjoining" from "abutt-
ing" see 1 AM. JUR., Adjoining Landowners, § 2.
20 El Paso Electric Co. v. Safeway, 257 S. W. 2d 502, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) er.
rel. n.r.e.
21 66 Tex. 534, 1 S. W. 658.
22 45 Tex. Civ. App. 480, 100 S. W. 1038.
1954]
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and 1911,2" involved Condition No. 1 along a fence line between
two farms. The defendant's ditch was dug near the property
line and caused the plaintiff's land to erode into it. The plain-
tiff had the consolation of getting a strongly worded opinion
upholding his rights on the first appeal, but after a reversal and
remand he was denied recovery on other grounds on the second
appeal.
Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co.,
Texas Commission of Appeals, 1927,24 added only a very gen-
eral dictum to the literature on the subject,25 the case being
decided on the point of negligent blasting.
McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,
193126 and 1934,27 involved Condition No. 3, with the problem
being to determine the effect of a City of Beaumont building
code provision after the jury had found that there was no
common law negligence. Here, as in the Simon v. Nance case,
the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining a favorable and strongly
worded opinion on the first appeal, setting forth the servient
owner's absolute duty under the ordinance to support the
plaintiff's building. The lateral support points were, however,
expressly brushed aside on the second appeal. The plaintiff
was able to recover but only upon a rather devious theory of
trespass.28
Williams v. Thompson, Texas Supreme Court, 1953,29 would
23 142 S. W. 661.
24 298 S. W. 554.
25 See quotation at note 3 supra.
26 45 S. W. 2d 293.
27 70 S. W. 2d 618, er. ref.
28 The plaintiff and defendant were cotenants in a private alleyway lying between
their properties. The defendant's removal (in connection with an excavation) of the
concrete with which the alley was paved was held to have been an "ouster" of his
cotenant and thus a trespass, which trespass allowed rain water to soak into the soil of
the alley, softening it and ultimately causing the damage to the plaintiff's building.
This theory added nothing to the law of lateral support and would be as applicable to
a third party, even a trespasser, as to an adjoining owner. 70 S. W. 2d at 624.
29 -...........Tex -----------,256 S. W. 2d 399.
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have involved the first condition had lateral support rules been
applied. The court stated that lateral support rules applied only
between adjoining landowners and that the rightful user of a
private easement was not such an "adjoining owner".
El Paso Electric Co. v. Safeway Stores, Court of Civil Ap-
peals of Texas, 1953,"0 was a case wherein the court attempted
to decide whether an underground electrical conduit was a
"structure" within the protection of the City of El Paso's build-
ing code. The effect of the court's strong support of the ordi-
nance has been weakened by the supreme court's refusal of a
writ of error with the notation, "no reversible error".
Several of the above cases are filled with language which indi-
cates that the Texas courts follow the general rules of other
jurisdictions. It appears significant that the three cases which
have elicited the most discussion of lateral support have been
decided in such a way that any stare decisis effect has been prac-
tically eliminated. The first opinion in Simon v. Nance31 con-
tained the strong and oft-cited 2 language of Key, J., regarding
the absolute right of the owner of the dominant estate to have his
land supported in its natural state by the owner of the servient
estate. On the subsequent appeal"3 of the case to the same court,
Rice, J., asserted the proposition that if the cost to the owner of
the dominant estate to support his own land was slight compared
to that which would be occasioned to the owner of the servient
estate to support it, then the owner of the dominant estate should
30 257 S. W. 2d 502, er. rel. n.r.e
31 Cited supra note 22.
2 Williams v. Thompson, -...........- Tex ------------- 256 S. W. 2d 399, 403 (1953), the court
pointing out that the right was described as "absolute"; Comanche Duke Oil Co. v.
Texas Pacific Coal Co., 298 S. W. 554, 559 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927); McDaniel v.
Wilson, 45 S. W. 2d 293, 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Brightwell v. Int. Great Northern
R. Co., 41 S. W. 2d 319, 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). None of these cases refers to the
later opinion in the same cause, 142 S. W. 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
s3 See note 23 supra.
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support his own land at his own expense. 4 The first opinion in
McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson"5 likewise contains much strong and
persuasive language with regard to the liability imposed upon an
excavator by a building ordinance, but the subsequent determina-
tion of the case on its second appeal36 ignored lateral support and
relied on trespass. In the El Paso Electric Co. case, 7 another
wherein the effect of a building ordinance was brought into ques-
tion, the court of civil appeals broadly supported the ordinance
and held that an underground electrical conduit was a "structure"
within the protection afforded by the ordinance, but even this
effect was weakened by the supreme court's notation, "no rever-
sible error".
In addition to the five doubtful opinions above mentioned, the
three remaining cases - two decided by the supreme court and
one by the commission of appeals - add little of practical value
to the right of lateral support. The Rowland case, 8 decided by
the supreme court, seemed only to follow the general rule that
when the third condition exists, the excavating owner of the
servient estate is not liable unless he was negligent. The Comanche
Duke case, 9 decided by the commission of appeals, added nothing
except the dictum aforementioned. The 1953 decision of the
supreme court in the Williams case4" served only to narrow any
right of lateral support which may have existed previously. The
court avoided a consideration of the law of lateral support in the
34 The court quoted 22 Cyc., Injunctions, pp. 782, 783, "... [W]hen the complainant
can at comparatively slight cost protect himself, he is not entitled to equitable relief."
142 S. W. at 664. The court in its summary referred to the "great injury" which would
result to the defendant and the "slight benefit" which would result to plaintiff before
it affirmed the trial court's action in refusing the plaintiff the injunctive relief which
he had sought. Although the court had mentioned earlier in the opinion that the plain-
tiff's petition had been in the alternative for damages should injunctive relief be denied,
the court took no occasion to mention this further or to rationalize the trial court's
action in refusing such prayer for damages.
35 Cited supra note 26.
36 Cited supra note 27.
37 Cited supra note 30.
38 Cited supra note 21.
39 Cited supra note 24.
40 Cited supra note 29.
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Williams case by holding that the one entitled to use an easement
and the owner of the abutting fee were not "adjoining land-
owners" so as to entitle the owner of the abutting fee to the right
of lateral support. The Williams case is significant mainly to
point up the rather anomalous results which can be reached by
our lateral support law in its present embryonic and confused
state. 1
In Texas the tug-of-war between policies - one favoring the
rights of the first comer and the other freeing the later developer
of unnecessary restriction - has resulted in a situation where the
later comer has every advantage. It is true that no case can be
found stating such a "rule", but among the Texas cases no one
can be found where the right of the dominant owner to support
has been unequivocally enforced. Texas' position can be seen
when results under each of the three conditions are compared
with those reached under the general rule elsewhere:
Condition 1. In the Simon 2 and Williams"s cases the plain-
tiffs sought protection against damage to land in its natural
state, but in neither of these vas the plaintiff able to recover.
Condition 2. Although we have no Texas case squarely
under the second condition - where the land would have fallen
even without the presence of the structure - this question seems
largely academic in view of the results reached in the Simon
and Williams cases. Doubt is possible under the second condi-
tion only after the court has imposed an absolute liability under
the first. Accepting liability under the first condition, there only
remains the question of whether the damages to the building
41 This unsatisfactory situation was pointed out in the dissent of Wilson, J., 256
S. W. 2d at 405. The dissent pointed out that, under the reasoning of the majority, had
the defendant had the fee to the roadway, he would have been bound to provide support
for the plaintiff's land, but since he was only one of many entitled to use a private
easement of passage, he had no duty at all to support the plaintiff's land but could
use the full width of the roadway without liability for removal of the support of plain-
tiff's land.
42 Cited supra notes 22 and 23.
43 Cited supra note 29.
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were incidental to the damages' to the land. Where it is held
that they were incidental, the defendant is held liable for the
entire damages. Since Texas courts have not been able to find
the owner of a servient estate liable even for the damages to
the land, it would seem that they may never get to the question
of whether damage to the structure was incidental. It is interest-
ing to note that the El Paso case could have been argued on
some such theory if counsel had felt that such a theory would
have been accepted. It would seem that if there had been an abso-
lute duty on the part of Safeway and its contractor to support the
soil in the alley, it would have been an easy step to find that the
damage to the underground conduit was incidental to the damage
to the soil.
Condition 3. Where the land would not have fallen but for
the weight of the structure, we have seen that Texas follows the
general common law rule of negligence."' The dominant owner
has little of practical value upon which to depend unless statutes
or building ordinances have imposed upon the excavator either
a statutory standard of care or an absolute liability. The Texas
courts have failed to affirm for owners of structures the full
protection which was intended by the municipal ordinances in
both the McDaniel" and El PasoScases. In neither of these cases
was the question of constitutionality discussed, and this question
poses a further disadvantage to the owner of the dominant
estate. If he should find himself protected by the letter of an
ordinance, it might still be open to the constitutional objection.
In view of the wide acceptance of such statutes elsewhere, it
appears that the danger of constitutional objection is slight and
could be overcome by properly framed ordinances and statutes.
In summary, the first-comer in Texas has practically nothing
to depend upon later. His position as a so-called dominant owner
44 Rowland v. Murphey, cited supra note 21.
45 Cited supra notes 26 and 27.
46 Cited supra note 30.
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is precarious when a later servient owner begins an excavation.
There is, however, little repugnance between this result and that
reached by the application of other Texas common law rules of
real property. If the owner of a mineral estate finds that the oil
and gas underneath his land are being extracted by the greater
productive capacity of his neighbor, he is told that he can protect
himself by digging more wells, not by imposing some hindrance
upon his neighbor. In Texas' law of adverse possession the courts
strain mightily to extinguish a bare legal right in favor of a later
developer of the land who may be nothing but a trespasser. Where
all the land along a stream is owned by private persons, Texas has
refused to recognize any vested rights such as those which would
be created under the "natural flow" theory, but rather has looked
to the "reasonable use" doctrine whereby a later upstream user
can, if he is making a reasonable riparian use of the water, entirely
deprive the lower owner of the water without regard to the dam-
ages occasioned.
An important difference between our present law of lateral sup-
port and the other doctrines mentioned above is that in each of the
three areas compared - the oil and gas rule of capture, the law
of adverse possession, and the law of riparian rights to water in
streams - there is some protection afforded the first-comer. In
the field of oil and gas the protection has been afforded by the
Railroad Commission's spacing and proration limitations which
apply to the first-comer and the late-comer alike. In the field of
adverse possession the first-comer, the claimant of the bare legal
title, certainly has the right to assert himself within some length of
time. In the field of riparian rights there is the exception that
certain appropriative rights may have been acquired by the first-




Our economy has a great stake in construction now in place,
that which is being undertaken, and that which must be undertaken
in the future. Interest should be shown in all phases of this prob-
lem and not limited to one single phase. The multi-million dollar
structures which are now being erected as a commonplace deserve
as substantial a sub-structure of law as of concrete and steel if
they are to survive undamaged through their useful life.
In many other jurisdictions it has been recognized that the
common law negligence rule will not afford necessary protection
to the owner of a building. These other jurisdictions have turned
to statutes and building ordinances to create affirmative duties
before damage is done.47 We have such ordinances which have been
enacted by Texas cities, an example being the following from
the City of Dallas Building Code, 1951:
Section 2801. Excavations.
All excavations for buildings and excavations accessory thereto shall
be protected and guarded against danger to life and property. All
permanent excavations shall have retaining walls of masonry or rein-
forced concrete of sufficient strength to retain the embankment to-
gether with any surcharged loads. No excavation for any purpose shall
extend within one (1) foot of the angle of repose or natural slope of
the soil under any footing or foundation, unless such footing or
foundation is first properly underpinned or protected against settle-
ment.
Any person causing an excavation to be made on his own property,
to a depth of ten (10) feet, or less, below the grade, shall protect the
excavation so that the soil of adjoining property will not cave in or
settle, but shall not be liable for the expense of underpinning or extend-
ing the foundation of buildings on adjoining properties where his
excavation is not in excess of ten (10) feet in depth. Before commenc-
ing the excavation the owner shall notify in writing the owners of
adjoining buildings not less than (10) days before such excavation
4 See Note, Lateral Support for Existing Buildings During New Construction, 50
Yale L. J. 1125 (1941).
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is to be made that the excavation is to be made and that the adjoining
buildings should be protected. The owners of the adjoining properties
shall be given access to the excavation for the purpose of protecting
such adjoining buildings. The person making or causing an excavation
to be made shall have the right of access to adjoining buildings but if
this right of access is denied, then the owners of the adjoining build-
ings will be held responsible for underpinning their walls.
Any person causing an excavation to be made exceeding ten (10)
feet in depth below the grade shall protect the excavation so that the
adjoining soil will not cave in or settle, and shall extend the founda-
ion of any adjoining buildings below the depth of ten (10) feet below
grade at his own expense. The owner of the adjoining buildings shall
extend the foundations of his buildings to a depth of ten (10) feet
below grade at his own expense as provided in the preceding para-
graph.48
To fix rights and duties Texas must either (1) obtain judicial
interpretation and endorsement of existing ordinances, or (2)
enact statutes which will meet the tests of constitutionality and
which will, incidentally, effect some degree of uniformity through-
out the state. The advantages of the latter in avoiding the infinite
variations of the municipal building codes and in giving some pro-
tection to structures outside any city limits would make it the more
desirable if the premise is accepted that one of the purposes of the
4s Note that the ordinance shifts the liability from the owner of the building to
the excavator at a depth of ten feet. For a very detailed analysis of the problems posed
by such ordinances see the article referred to in note 47 supra. It will be noted that
the ordinance has the effect of forcing the one building after the date of the ordinance
to construct a reasonably good foundation (one at least ten feet deep) lest he be
later liable for carrying his foundation to a ten-foot depth if an excavation is begun
next door. The fear that the first building would be inferior and that it would thereby
place an unreasonable burden on later construction was one of the great concerns of
the common law judges, and one which forced them ever away from placing an abso-
lute duty upon the excavator to support existing structures. The SOUTHERN STANDARD
BUILDING CODE (2d ed. 1945, rev. 1948), published by the Southern Building Code
Congress, contains a provision similar to that in the Dallas Code at p. 165. The BAsic
BUILDING CODE (1950), published by the Building Officials Conference of America,
Inc. (of which Dallas is a member), contains provisions similar to those in the Dallas
Code, p. 286 et. seq. A note states: ". .. The depth of excavation at which the excavator's
responsibility should start is a matter of local policy and rule and varies in different
jurisdictions. The municipality should specify the limiting depth at which respon-
sibility changes. In Niagara Falls, New York, it is fixed at three (3) feet, the assumed
frost line, which is the minimum required legal depth for all foundations in that
municipality. In New York City, the statutory depth is ten (10) feet ...."
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law is to enable citizens to proceed with some reasonable assurance
of their rights, duties, and liabilities.
Until one of the above is accomplished, the only safe advice to
the owner of any dominant estate is that he support his own land
and structures if he wants to be sure that they will not be damaged
by subsidence. The right of the dominant owner to insist that his
neighbor not remove the other side of the "arch" or open the door
near the bottom of the "grain bin" has not been established by
the Texas courts at this date.
Charles G. Thrash, Jr.
